AGENTIC AI 75 · #19
Runtime agent quarantine
NVIDIA described Sentry as able to isolate agents attempting to exceed their permitted boundaries.
Last reviewed 2026-11-11
Agentic AI 75 / #19
2026 status: Vendor-reported platform capability · Category: Runtime containment
The 2026 development
NVIDIA described Sentry as able to isolate agents attempting to exceed their permitted boundaries.
The governance gap
Quarantine is only trustworthy if it is fast, cross-process and recorded. A quarantine that depends on the same process it is containing can be starved by that process.
Where CAIN-42 fits: Moat 7 — Autonomous Trust Control Loop
Core question: Can verified experience change future trust? Monitor, detect, contain, recover, and re-authorise from observed outcomes.
Contain the agent, not just the request: revoke capabilities, stop the fleet, preserve the evidence and require a human release. CAIN's quarantine and fleet-kill paths use a shared store so a second process can halt a runaway first process.
How the wiring works
- Detect the boundary breach from the decision path, not from the agent's self-report.
- Revoke the agent's outstanding capability tokens.
- Signal the fleet halt through the cross-process store and verify the halt.
- Preserve a signed containment receipt and require dual-key recovery.
What is real today
LIVE A public route in this deployment exercises this mechanism today, within its stated scope.
The public drill runs against a throwaway database and a demo agent. Sub-50ms halt is a design target measured in the drill, not a guarantee for every deployment.
| Component in this repository | What the module says it is |
|---|---|
cain/quarantine.py | CAIN Trust Fabric - Autonomous Swarm Fleet Quarantine & Kill-Switch (Moat #2, #6 & #7) |
cain/fleet_kill.py | CAIN-42 cross-host fleet kill switch (2026-11-10). Self-contained: Python stdlib + `cryptography`. |
cain/argus/reauthorization.py | CAIN ARGUS — continuous re-authorization engine (Prompt 14, sections 8-9). |
cain/execution_chain/capability.py | Attenuated, audience/destination-bound cross-system execution capability (Evolution 10, Phase 4). |
Descriptions are the first line of each module's own docstring, read without importing it. A module path is a pointer into this repository, not a hosted endpoint. Its existence is checked by the test suite; its status for this use is the label above.
Check it yourself
- Run the live quarantine drill
/api/v1/quarantine/drill - Fire a live decision through the CAIN-42 pipeline
/fabric/try— the same enforcement path every product sits behind.
Commercial package
| Offer | Runtime Containment Audit |
|---|---|
| Buyer | SOC and agent-platform teams |
| Price (proposal) | $2,500–$5,000 per audit; $1,500–$4,000/month retainer |
| Bundle | Runtime Containment & Evidence — Contain first, then prove what happened. |
| Operator stream | Stream 3 of the 10-stream operator playbook |
SOC, incident response, compliance, enterprise IT is the bundle buyer. The entry offer for this bundle is Runtime containment review; signed evidence pack; the range is $2,500–$5,000 per review; $2,000–$10,000 per evidence pack. A price on this page is a proposal, not a validated rate, and no customer is claimed.
Buy this as a product or service
CAIN-A75-019 — Runtime Containment Audit DELIVERABLE
A bounded engine run on the buyer's sample: findings, a written report, and a SHA-256 artifact manifest. The manifest is unsigned: it is not a signature and not an attestation.
Kind: Retainer · Price (proposal): $2,500–$5,000 per audit; $1,500–$4,000/month retainer · Lead time: 5 business days.
Open the product page · all 75 products
What this page does not claim
What this page is not. CAIN-42 is not affiliated with, endorsed by, integrated into, or shipped with the organisation named in the 2026 item. The item is public context; the page describes how CAIN-42 would govern that class of capability. No page here claims a customer, a partnership, a certification, a patent, or a production integration. Prices are proposals. Built by a three-person team.