Stopping hidden instructions
Quarantine: instructions are not memories
Text that tries to give the agent orders is stored, locked away, and only released by a person.
What gets caught
Text that tries to override instructions, switch the agent's task, change its role, extract its hidden prompt, or force a specific answer. Before checking, AETHER-33 undoes common disguises: look-alike letters, invisible characters, odd spacing and simple encodings.
What quarantine means
- The memory is kept, not thrown away, so the attempt itself is on the record.
- Its status says quarantined and the reason says which pattern matched.
- Search never returns its text.
- Only someone with the reviewer secret can read it or release it, and they must give their name. The release is written into the log.
Why a secret and not just a name
If the agent could release its own quarantined memories, quarantine would be pointless. So the person who reviews sets a secret once and keeps it away from the agent. Set it before you give an agent access, because whoever sets it first holds it.
curl -X POST https://cainstudio.online/aether33/api/reviewer \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"secret":"choose-a-long-secret"}'
What it misses
This is pattern matching. A politely reworded attack, another language, or an attack that uses no obvious command words can get through. That is why the next rule matters most: even a bad memory that gets in can never grant permission. See “Memory is never permission.”
grants_authority: false.
No third-party audit has been performed. Limits ·
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